Competition, corporate governance and financing of corporate growth in emerging markets by Glen, Jack et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Competition, corporate governance and
financing of corporate growth in
emerging markets
Jack Glen and Kevin Lee and Ajit Singh
IFC, The World Bank group, University of Leicester, University of
Cambridge
1. June 2000
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/53625/
MPRA Paper No. 53625, posted 13. February 2014 17:33 UTC
 FIRST DRAFT 
 
 
 
 
 
COMPETITION, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCING 
OF CORPORATE GROWTH IN EMERGING MARKETS. 
 
Empirical Investigations in the Light of the Asian Crisis. 
 
 
 
 
 
Jack Glen (IFC), Kevin Lee (University of Leicester) 
 and Ajit Singh (Cambridge University). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paper prepared for presentation at the AEA 2000 Annual Meetings in 
Boston, 7
th
 to 9
th
 January 2000. 
 
 
 
 
 
Comments most welcome.  Please do not quote without the agreement of the 
authors.  For correspondence please contact Prof. Ajit Singh, Faculty of 
Economics, Sidgwick Avenue, Cambridge CB3 9DD, England. E-mail: 
Ajit.singh@econ.cam.ac.uk 
Tel:  44 – 1223 350434 
Fax:  44 – 1223 740479
 1 
  
ABSTRACT 
 
The micro-economic behaviour of economic agents in the crisis-affected 
Asian economies, together with the private sector’s expanding role in 
developing countries in general have focused attention on issues of 
competition, corporate governance and finance. The paper explores the 
analytical links between these phenomena. It provides evidence on the 
dynamics of product market competition in seven emerging economies by 
time series analysis of persistence of corporate profitability during the 1980s 
and 90s. The surprising central finding is that the intensity of competition in 
emerging markets is no less than in advanced countries. The paper also 
briefly reports on major changes in the financing of corporate growth in 
India and considers its implications for the extant theories of law, finance 
and corporate governance. 
 
 
Keywords: competition, persistency of profits, unit roots, emerging markets. 
 
JEL classification: G3; L1; D4; O1 
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Competition, Corporate Governance and Financing of Corporate 
Growth in Emerging Markets. 
 
Empirical Investigations in the Light of the Asian Crisis. 
 
 
I. Introduction 
The Asian crisis, which in 1997 and 1998 devastated some of the world's hitherto most 
successful economies, has called attention to the microeconomic behavior of economic 
agents in these societies. Issues relating to the nature and degree of competition which 
large firms are subject to, as well as questions of corporate governance and the financing 
of corporate growth have come in for special scrutiny.  A very important and influential 
analysis of the crisis asserts that although certain macroeconomic imbalances may have 
provided the trigger for the crisis, its deeper reasons lie in the structural factors inherent 
in the model of Asian capitalism long implemented by these countries
1
. 
 
Specifically, it is suggested that the East Asian crisis has in part been caused by over-
investment which in turn resulted from a poor competitive environment and disregard for 
profits in corporate investment decisions. Similarly, it is argued that the close relationship 
between government, business and finance, typical in these economies, led to high 
debt:equity ratios in the corporate sector. High gearing made the corporate sector 
                                                          
1
 For differing perspectives on the causes of the financial crisis in East Asian countries, see among others 
Feldstein (1998), Krugman (1998), Roubini et al. (1998), Wade and Veneroso (1998), Sachs and Radelet 
(1998), IMF (1998), World Bank (1998), Singh (1999) and Stiglitz (1999).  For contributions which 
specifically attribute the crisis to the Asian model of capitalism see for example Greenspan (1998), 
Summers (1998), Frankel (1998), Phelps (1999).  See also IMF (1998) and the US Council for Economic 
Advisers (1998). 
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 financially fragile and vulnerable to interest rate and exchange rate (in the case of 
external corporate debt) shocks. Krugman (1998) suggested that “crony capitalism” 
contributed to financial fragility through its pervasiveness in the critical financial sector. 
The financial sector was under-regulated, political favouritism permitted it to over-invest 
in areas such as property, and was also subject to implicit guarantees that the government 
would bail it out if serious problems developed.  
 
A related argument is made in terms of transparency. The international capital markets, it 
is suggested, did not have adequate information about the true financial status of the East 
Asian corporations and the banks. Once the markets began to assess the true facts there 
was a collapse of confidence. As the previous Managing Director of the IMF put it:  
“In Korea, for example, opacity had become systemic. The lack of 
transparency about government, corporate and financial sector 
operations concealed the extent of Korea's problems - so much so 
that corrective action came too late and ultimately could not 
prevent the collapse of market confidence, with the IMF finally 
being authorised to intervene just days before potential 
bankruptcy”.2 
 
Although this thesis of inadequate competition and poor corporate governance as being 
the “deeper” causes of  the Asian crisis remains controversial3, it deserves serious 
examination. This is for three reasons. First, the analysis has found favour not only in the 
highest circles in the US government, but also with the IMF. Hence the IMF bail-out 
packages for these countries have required them to fundamentally change their existing 
institutional arrangements with respect to the relationships between government, banks  
                                                          
2
 Speech to Transparency International, reported in IMF Survey, 9 February 1998. 
3
 It has been strongly challenged in Singh (1999a), (1999b).  Singh attributes the crisis to the abandonment 
of some of the basic tenets of an Asian model by the crisis-effected countries in the years immediately 
 4 
 and corporations, so as to make these economies more market oriented, more based on 
arms-length relationships between the government and the private sector and more 
subject to the forces of competition rather than government direction. This would involve 
far-reaching changes in corporate governance arrangements, labour laws and antitrust 
laws (as well as the enforcement of these laws) in these countries
4
. 
 
The second reason for exploring these subjects is that they are important in their own 
right. They are not only significant in relation to the current Asian crisis and the specific 
countries affected by it, but are also much more generally relevant for developing 
countries as a whole. Following privatisation, liberalisation of external markets and 
internal deregulation, most of these economies now have a greatly enhanced role for the 
private sector and for market forces. It is therefore important to ask, for example, how 
competitive is the emerging and expanding private sector in order to assess its economic 
performance. 
 
Thirdly, and very importantly, despite their intrinsic interest and obvious policy 
relevance, there is very little research on the nature and degree of competition in 
emerging markets or on corporate governance and corporate finance in these countries. 
With respect to the former there are few studies, even in the limited structure- conduct-
performance paradigm. Similarly, until the recent efforts by economists at the World 
Bank and by scholars at the National Bureau of Economic Research (discussed below), 
                                                                                                                                                                             
preceding the crisis.  He ascribes the over-investment and misallocation of resources to the property sector 
to precipitate financial liberalisation. See also Stiglitz, (1998), (1999). 
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 most studies of corporate governance have been concerned only with advanced 
economies.  
 
The main purpose of this paper is to contribute towards filling this gap in the literature by 
studying the dynamics of the competitive process in developing countries.  It does so by a 
time-series analysis of the persistence of corporate rates of return in seven emerging 
markets - South Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, India, Brazil, Mexico and Jordan. The 
following kinds of questions are asked. How competitive are the developing country 
product markets and how, in any case, should the intensity of competition be measured? 
Is competition more intense in Latin American than in Asian markets? How do the Asian 
and Latin American markets compare in this respect with product markets in the UK, US 
and other advanced economies? 
 
In addition to the above questions which are the main focus of this paper, it also briefly 
examines the evolution of the financing of corporate growth and of stock market 
development in the specific case of the Indian economy in the 1980s and 1990s. It is 
suggested that this evolution has been rapid and significant and that in many respects, the 
Indian case is not unique. It, however, raises useful questions for current research on law, 
finance, corporate governance and development. 
 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows.  Section II examines analytical links 
between competition in product and capital markets, corporate governance and corporate 
                                                                                                                                                                             
4
 The morality and wisdom of imposing such conditionality on sovereign nations by international 
organisations has been strongly questioned by Feldstein, (1998). 
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 finance.  Sections III to V report on the methodology and the results of empirical study 
of corporate rates of return in seven emerging markets and draw inferences for the 
intensity of competition in the product markets.  Section VI reports briefly on the 
evolution of corporate finance and stock market development in India during the last two 
decades and considers its implications for the extant theories of corporate governance in 
emerging markets.  Section VII concludes. 
 
 
II.  Competition, Corporate Governance and Corporate Finance in Advanced and 
Developing Economies. 
 
II.1  Competition and Corporate Governance 
  
Seminal contributions of nearly fifty years ago by Alchian (1950) and Friedman (1953) 
indicated a close relationship between competition and corporate governance. These 
studies suggested that regardless of the separation between ownership and control of the 
kind documented by Berle and Means (1933), competitive selection process in the 
product markets would ensure that managers are obliged to maximise profits. A careful 
examination of this claim by Winters (1964) indicated, however, that it was not valid in 
all states of the world, but only under rather limited conditions of perfect competition and 
unfettered entry. Specifically, Winters’ modeling of the selection mechanism suggested 
that if there were imperfect competition, barriers to entry and/or economies of scale, 
managers of large corporations would not need to maximise profits in order to survive.  
 7 
  
These findings shifted the argument to the capital market and the market for corporate 
control. Alchian and Kessel (1962) and Manne (1965) suggested that notwithstanding the 
degree of competition in product markets, perfect competition in the capital market and in 
the market for corporate control will resolve Berle and Means's agency problem by 
forcing managers to maximise share-holders’ wealth. Even if the product market were 
wholly monopolised, those firms which did not maximise monopoly profits and preferred 
say, the easy life, would become takeover targets for those who were willing to do so. 
The latter would potentially have higher share prices on the stock market than the former, 
providing an opportunity and an incentive for a takeover to occur.
5
 
 
Subsequent research has indicated that for a number of theoretical as well as practical 
reasons - asymmetric information, transactions costs, Grossman and Hart's free rider 
problem, capital market imperfections - the takeover mechanism on the capital market 
may not be adequate for the task of resolving agency questions in the modern corporate 
economy. Further empirical evidence for the advanced economies of the US and the UK
6
 
indicates that selection in the market for corporate control does not take place entirely on 
the basis of efficiency, i.e. profitability or stock market valuation. Although profitability 
matters, absolute size matters a great deal more. A large, relatively unprofitable company 
has a much better chance of survival than a small profitable one. Moreover, it is almost 
invariably the large that take over the small. Indeed, the acquisition process may operate 
                                                          
5
 See further Marris (1964), Singh (1971). 
6
 For the UK studies see Meeks (1977); Cosh, Hughes and Singh (1989), (1997); For the US see Schwarz 
(1982), Mueller (1980), Warshawsky (1987), Ravenscraft and Scherer (1989). For review articles see 
Hughes (1991), Singh (1992), (1993). 
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 in a perverse way since a large unprofitable company can increase its immunity to 
takeovers through the takeover process itself - by becoming larger through the acquisition 
of small firms
7
.  
 
Most developing countries do not yet have an active market for corporate control in the 
Anglo-Saxon sense. Some of them, for example India and Brazil, have embryonic 
markets which may soon mature.  However, these markets are likely to be even more 
imperfect and suffer from informational deficits than markets in the US and the UK. For 
these and other reasons, Singh (1998a) argues that such markets are unlikely to provide a 
satisfactory solution to the corporate governance issues in developing countries. 
 
In view of these difficulties with the market for corporate control, the wheel has come 
almost the full circle in advanced economies. It has been suggested that it is the severe 
product market competition in a liberalised global economy which is more likely to 
constrain corporate managers in the pursuit of their own objectives at the expense of the 
firm's shareholders
8
. Such competition however is likely to be oligopolistic and of non-
price variety, which may not have the welfare enhancing properties of textbook price 
competition. Be that as it may, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) suggest that despite greater 
and more intense competition, there will still be an agency problem in large corporations 
with separation of ownership and control: managers and owners interests as well as their 
optimal strategies for dealing with competition may differ. Nevertheless, product market 
competition remains a powerful force for ensuring good corporate governance although it 
                                                          
7
 Singh (1998), Greer (1986), Singh (1971) 
8
 See further,  Cosh, Hughes and Singh (1990). 
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 may need to be supplemented by other measures. This is especially so in developing 
countries where for all its deficiencies, as noted above, there does not yet exist an active 
market for corporate control. 
 
II.2  Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance. 
 
Turning to the relationship between corporate finance and corporate governance, the two 
are closely related almost by definition. Thus Schleifer and Vishny (1997)  in their 
important review article on the subject:  ‘Corporate governance deals with the ways in 
which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their 
investment’.  The two authors suggest that the central issue of corporate governance is, 
‘How do suppliers of finance control managers?’.  
 
 In this context it is useful to inquire what would be the economists apriori expectations 
about how developing country firms would finance their growth; to what extent would 
they use external rather than internal finance; how would their financing patterns differ 
from those for advanced country firms. Economic analysis would suggest that developing 
country corporations, operating as they do in under-developed and imperfect capital 
markets, may be obliged to finance most of their growth from internal sources. Moreover 
one would expect them to have little recourse, if any, to the stock market to finance their 
investment projects. This is due to three reasons. First, because of informational and 
regulatory shortcomings of emerging stock markets, as well as the fact that most firms in 
these markets will not have established market reputations, the pricing process is likely to 
 10 
 be noisy and arbitrary. One result would be considerable share price volatility especially 
compared with that in more mature markets
9
. This volatility would tend to discourage 
firms from seeking a stock market listing or attempting to raise funds by new issues. 
Secondly share price volatility  reduces the efficiency of market signals and that may also 
be expected to discourage risk-averse investors from raising funds, and indeed even from 
securing listings on the stock market. Thirdly, there is evidence to suggest that typically 
large corporations in developing countries are family-owned and controlled (see further 
below), which may be expected to make them more reluctant to issue equity for fear of 
losing control of the corporation. To sum up, these considerations suggest that developing 
country firms may be expected to rely heavily on internal finance; to the extent that they 
need more resources they may be expected to resort more to bank borrowings than to 
raise finance from the stock market; many deserving firms may also shun stock market 
listing altogether.  In other words, corporations in emerging markets, for somewhat 
different reasons, may also be expected to follow the same pecking-order pattern of 
finance which is observed in advanced country corporations.
10
 
 
II.3  Law, Finance and Corporate Governance. 
 
The study of corporate governance in developing countries has received an enormous 
stimulus from the recent contributions of La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 
                                                          
9
 For a theoretical discussion of the pricing process in emerging markets see further Tirole (1991). 
 
10
 Myers and Majfluf’s (1984) classic paper attributed the pecking order pattern of finance observed for 
advanced country corporations to essentially asymmetric information between managers and outside 
investors.  Developing country corporations are not immune from asymmetric information, but there are 
additional reasons to expect, in their case, the greater use of internal finance followed by debt and turning 
to stock-market finance only as a last resort.  See further, Singh (1995). 
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 (referred to as LLSV).  In a series of pioneering papers, LLSV (1997), (1998), (1999), 
(1999a), (2000) have researched the relationship between countries basic legal 
framework, corporate finance and corporate governance; between company law and 
corporate ownership structures; between law and dividend policies; and that between 
protection of minority shareholders and stock market valuation of the companies.  The 
authors and their collaborators (see for example Levine et al (1998); Johnson et al (1998); 
Rajan and Zingales (1998)) have greatly added to our knowledge of corporate ownership 
patterns in developed and developing countries.  They have also enhanced our 
understanding of the nature of the agency problem in corporations in non-Anglo Saxon 
economies.  They suggest that outside the U.K. and the U.S., a Berle and Means type of 
corporation with dispersed shareholding and a separation of ownership from control is a 
rarity.  In most countries, through one mechanism or another, corporations tend to be 
owner-controlled and managed, usually by families.  LLSV perceive the predominant 
agency problems in these corporations to be one of ensuring that the minority 
shareholders are not exploited by the dominant family owner-managers.  
 
Empirical evidence from India bearing on the issues raised under II.2 and II.3 above will 
be briefly considered in Section VI. 
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III. Measuring the Intensity of Competition in Emerging Markets: 
Methodological Issues 
 
 
III.1 Product Market Competition in Emerging Markets 
 
There are divergent opinions about the nature and degree of competition found in 
developing country product markets.  Laffont (1999) suggests for example, that these 
markets tend to be small and therefore suffer from a variety of imperfections.  Many 
developing countries do not have any anti-trust or anti-monopoly legislation at all.  Even 
when such legislation exists, governments are not always able to enforce it.  Further, 
governments often subsidise large firms to develop national champions and thereby affect 
market structure, firm behaviour and performance in many distortionary ways. 
 
With respect to the more advanced semi-industrial economies, such as Korea, India or 
Brazil, it is generally believed that their manufacturing sectors are dominated by large 
corporations and consequently tend to be monopolistic.  Available cross-country 
evidence for some leading newly-industrialising countries (NICs) provides some support 
for this view (see Table 1).  Other scholars, however, believe that despite extensive 
government involvement and guidance of corporate activities, and often weak 
enforcement of anti-trust laws, the domestic markets of many NICs are highly 
competitive.  Thus World Bank (1993) in its seminal study of the East Asian Miracle 
Economies: 
“Even though Japan and Korea have tended to have high levels of  
concentration in their manufacturing sector … , domestic competition  
has usually been vigorous.  The Japanese government has proceeded  
on the assumption that competition among fewer, more evenly matched  
firms is preferable to having one large firm competing with many smaller 
 rivals, a principle that is well-recognized in athletic competitions 
 (Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983))." 
 
It is suggested that this competition is not always market-based but may be “contest-
based”.  World Bank (1993) notes: 
“(East Asian Miracle Economies) developed institutional structures  
 13 
 in which firms competed for valued economic prizes, such as access  
to credit, in some dimensions while actively cooperating in others; 
 in short, they created contests.” 
 
Porter (1990) endorses this characterization of the intensity of competition in Korea and 
Japan.  In relation to Korea, for example, on the basis of detailed empirical studies of 
several industries, he suggests that Korean conglomerates compete with each other far 
more than those in most other countries.  Indeed, Porter ascribes the outstanding success 
of the Korean economy to the high degree of competition among the large oligopolistic 
firms.  However, as indicated in the Introduction, a number of economists attribute the 
recent crisis in Asian countries, including Korea, to poor competitive environment and 
the disregard of profits in corporate decisions. 
 
There are, however, very few comparative, systematic empirical studies to shed light on 
the issue.
11
  Even the kind of data in Table 1 is not available for more than a few 
developing countries, particularly for the 1990s.  In this and the following sections we 
examine the dynamics of competitive process in seven emerging markets during the 
1980s and early 1990s.  We use the same methodology which has been widely employed 
for studying the intensity of competition in advanced countries and compare the results 
for the two groups of countries.
12
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11
 A notable recent exception is Robertson and Tybout, (1996).  The book provides detailed analyses on 
competitive structure, corporate behaviour and performance for six countries.  Chile (1979-1986), 
Colombia (1997-1985), Mexico (1985-1990), Turkey (1976-1985).  See also Amsden, (1989) for a 
comparison of market structures in Korea and Taiwan.  Amjad, (1982) and Kambhampati, (1996) provide 
useful analyses of structure, conduct and performance of  Pakistani and Indian industries respectively. 
12
 Such a comparative exercise has not been carried out before for emerging markets except Glen, Singh 
and Matthias, (1999).  The present study improves upon it by using more reliable data and more balanced 
panels.  It also improves methodologically upon the earlier study as well as a number of those carried out 
for advanced economies. 
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III.2.  Persistence of Profitability and Intensity of Competition 
 
One important way of examining the dynamics of the competitive process and measuring 
the intensity of competition in a market economy is to consider the question of 
persistence in corporate rates of return.  Despite their wide usage, industrial economists 
accept that structural characteristics of an industry (e.g. concentration ratios such as those 
in Table 1) do not convey adequate information about the intensity of competition in the 
modern economy.  There may be a high concentration ratio in an industry and yet 
competition may be intense between oligopolistic firms over market share, new products, 
design, sales, etc.  Such competitive dynamics may be captured by examining the 
persistence of corporate rates of return.  If competition is intense there is likely to be little 
persistency in the relative rates of return of different firms.  Those with above average 
profits in one period will not be expected to have excess profits in the subsequent period 
since they will be eroded by competitors.  With a lower intensity of competition, 
profitability differences between firms may be expected to be more persistent.  For 
example, Waring (1996), reports that in the U.S. car industry, the three leading firms had 
persistent profitability differences throughout the 1970s.  General Motors was 
persistently more profitable than Ford and the latter persistently more profitable than 
Chrysler.  In general in U.S. industry, there was a decline in the persistency of rates of 
return during this period. 
 
 15 
 This essentially Schumpetarian perspective on the competitive process has been adopted 
in a number of studies to examine the dynamics of competition in industrial countries.  
Following Mueller’s (1986) seminal study for U.S. corporate data, empirical studies in 
this tradition
13
 normally use a first order auto-regressive model of corporate profitability 
which permits the estimation of a company’s long-term equilibrium profits, as well as the 
speed of adjustment towards this long-term level.  The model is derived as follows: 
 
A firm 's profitability in time period t (Ptt) is assumed to consist of three components: 
 
a.  a competitive return on capital C which is common to all companies. 
 
b.  a permanent rent (Ri) peculiar to the firm itself and,  
 
c.  a short run quasi rent (Sit) which is also peculiar to the firm, varies over time, and 
tends toward zero in the long run. 
 
Thus:       (1) 
It is further assumed that: U+S=S it1-itit    (2) 
Where: 0< <1  and Uit are distributed N(0,
2 ) 
From equations (1) and (2), the following equation is obtained: 
U+P+)R+)(C-(1=P it1-itiit    (3) 
                                                          
13
 See, for example, Conolly and Schwartz (1985), Geroski and Cubbin (1987), Geroski (1988, 1990), 
Geroski and Jacquemin (1988), Mueller (1986, 1990), Mueller and Geroski (1990), Odagiri (1994), Schohl 
(1990), Waring (1996). 
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 Letˆ  and ˆ i be the estimates from the autoregressive equation: 
U+P+a=P it1-itiit ˆˆ     (4) 
Provided lamda hat (i ) is  1, the equilibrium or long-run profitability level of firm (i) is 
given by: 
 
).-/(1a=P iip ˆˆ     (4a) 
 
As Geroski (1990) notes, equation (4) is best regarded as a reduced form of a more 
elaborate structural model involving entry and exit of firms both of which depend on 
profits - to be more precise, on expected positive or negative ‘excess’ returns (relative to 
the long-term norm).  However, the estimation of a full structural model is beset with 
difficulties, because of the classic latent variable problem: changes in profits are a 
function of the threat of entry, rather than entry itself.  Even if no entry takes place, the 
threat of entry may induce firms to lower prices and profits as a strategic option. Indeed, 
in the limiting case, as Baumol et al. (1982) showed, even a monopolist may be 
compelled to charge competitive prices if there is sufficient entry and other conditions are 
met to make the market ‘contestable’. 
 
Equation (4), despite its limitations due to being a reduced form, has the virtue of not 
requiring any unobservable variables to map competitive dynamics. Nevertheless, it is 
important to note that equation (4) does not allow us to distinguish between different 
sources of persistency, specifically that which may arise from persistent monopoly power 
or because good management allows a firm to be continuously more efficient than others. 
Entry and exit forces which erode excess profits apply to both sources of such profits. 
 17 
  
To sum up, for studying competitive dynamics and for measuring the intensity of 
competition in an industry or an economy, the following parameters estimated from 
equation (4) are of interest: 
a.  The long-term equilibrium rates of profit Pip of individual corporations in 
order to discover whether there are firms which have persistent above(or 
below)-the-norm (usually approximated by the average rate of return in a 
cross-section of firms) profits even in the long run. 
 
b.  The speed of adjustment towards this long term level ( ). The higher the 
value of λ, the lower the speed of adjustment indicating the existence of 
various barriers to entry which permit persistently high profits (which may 
either be due to monopoly power or good management). 
 
c.  The variance of Uit [V(Uit)] indicates the effect of “luck” on corporate profits 
which is not expected to be persistent. 
  
IV. Persistence of profits in emerging markets: Time Series Analysis{PRIVATE } 
 
 
The methodology outlined above will be employed in this section to analyse the persistence 
of profitability in seven emerging markets; namely, Brazil, India, Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, 
Mexico and Zimbabwe. The data set employed in the analysis consists of annual 
 18 
 observations on profitability in a subset of the largest 100 corporations quoted on the 
emerging stock markets of these seven countries. The subset represents those firms in each 
country which have a common run of data in excess of 10 observations; firms with broken 
runs of data are excluded on the grounds that time series methods are inapplicable with such 
short time series
14
.  
 
Taking each country in turn, profitability in firm i at time t, Pit, i=1,...,m, t=1,...,T, is 
measured by the return on assets, defined as earnings after tax divided by total assets. 
Table 2 provides a summary of the profitability of firms for the chosen sample period within 
each country. These rates of return are broadly similar to those reported for the larger data 
set by Glen, Singh and Mathias (1999). They are also much the same as those found by 
other investigators for the same countries and time periods
15
. 
 
Following the practice of the studies for advanced countries, the regression analysis is 
undertaken on the transformed profitability measures Yit = Pit -Pt, where Pt is the average of 
the Pit across firms. The measure Yit represents the deviation of the profitability of firm i at 
time t from the profitability of all other firms in the country at that time. The analysis is 
based on second order autoregressive (AR) models of the form  
 
 Yit = i + 1i Yi(t-1) + 2i Yi(t-2) + it     (5) 
 
                                                          
14
 A larger data set, incorporating all the 100 largest corporations in 10 emerging stock markets, was used, 
and is described in detail, in Glen, Singh and Mathias (1999). The three countries excluded from the analysis 
of the current paper, on the grounds that there are fewer than 10 time series observations for the corporations of 
these countries, are Argentina, Peru and Thailand. 
 19 
 for i=1,...,m and t=1,...,T, where i, 1i and 2i are coefficients and the it are random errors. 
Given the relatively short time dimension of our data, it seems reasonable to restrict 
attention to second order AR models (and the empirical analysis shows that this a second 
order lag is sufficient to capture the dynamics in all cases).  
 
The model of (5) provides a simple characterisation of the dynamics of profitability for each 
firm. If 2i=0 for all i, then the estimates of 1i provide a direct measure of the speed of 
adjustment of profitability following a shock. Assuming 1i < 1 (and the validity of this 
assumption is discussed below), adjustment to equilibrium is monotonic in this case, and 
profitability responds most quickly in firms with smaller values of 1i. Where 2i is not zero, 
however, adjustment to a shock can take place non-monotonically, and there is no unique 
way of characterising the speed of adjustment based on the estimated parameters. Hence, 
there is no unique ranking of firms' speeds of adjustment. In what follows, we shall 
concentrate on the measure i = 1i + 2i as an indication of the speed of adjustment. (This 
will, of course, be equal to 1i when 2i is zero). 
 
 
Testing for the presence of unit roots 
The first issue to address in the analysis of the persistence of profitability is whether there 
exists a unit root in the profitability data. The presence of a unit root would indicate that 
shocks to profitability persist indefinitely and that competitive pressures never erode 
differentials in profitability. The presence of a unit root implies that (5) can be written 
                                                                                                                                                                             
15
 See Annex to Claessens, Djankov and Lang (1998). 
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 Yit = i + i Yi(t-1) + it              (6) 
 
where Yit = Yit – Yi(t-1), so that i= 1i-1, -i= 2i and i= 1i+2i= 1. In the model of (6), a 
1% increase in profitability in time t will result in profitability being 1/(1-i)% higher at the 
infinite horizon than it would have been in the absence of the shock
16
.  
 
Investigating the presence of a unit root in the profitability series is an essential precursor to 
the analysis of the speed of adjustment of profitability in a model of the form (5), where 
stationarity is assumed. But there are difficulties: tests of the unit root hypothesis have 
notoriously low power and that problem is compounded in our case since we have only a 
small number of time series observations for each firm. However, a relatively powerful test 
of the unit root hypothesis is provided by Im et al (1997) in situations where the data under 
investigation also has a cross-section dimension, as here. The ‘standardised t-bar test’ 
proposed by Im et al. exploits the panel structure of the data and is based on the average 
value of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic calculated for each of the individual firm's 
data, adf(i); i.e. the average value of the t-statistic on the coefficient i in the rewritten 
version of (5) given by the Dickey-Fuller regression: 
 
 Yit = i + i Yi(t-1) + i Yi(t-1) + it    (7)   
                                                          
16
 In the time series literature, the measure 1/(1-i) is denoted the "persistence" of the shock; using this 
terminology, any stationary series, modelled by (5) with 1i+2i not equal to unity, has zero persistence as the 
effect of any shock dies away to zero at the infinite horizon. In the analysis here, following the industrial 
economics literature, we use the term ‘persistence’ to mean the speed of adjustment to equilibrium in a 
stationary model. 
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where, comparing the model with (5), i= -[1-1i-2i]= -[1-i] and i= -2i. In calculating the 
adf statistics, it is important that the it do not display serial correlation. The inclusion of the 
lagged Yi(t-1) term is therefore potentially important although, given the relatively small 
samples involved, the inclusion of an unnecessary additional regressor is to be avoided if it 
makes no contribution to the regression. We therefore calculated two sets of tests of the unit 
root hypothesis in our seven countries; in the first (unrestricted) set, Yi(t-1) is included in all 
regressions while, in the second (parsimonious) set, the test is conducted on the basis of 
firms' regression chosen through a specification search in which the Schwarz-Bayesian 
Criterion (SBC) is calculated to decide whether or not to exclude the lagged Yi,t-1 term. Im 
et al. show that the standardised t-bar statistic has a standard normal distribution when m 
and T are large and m/T is small. For smaller samples, they provide appropriate critical 
values obtained through Monte Carlo simulation against which to compare the standardised 
t-bar statistic. 
 
Tables 3 and 4 summarise the relevant results obtained for each country in turn by 
estimating the model of (7) across all firms following the specification search described 
above. Table 3 shows the summary statistics for the distribution of the i, of the 
i=1i+2i=1+i and of the adfi across the firms for each country. The Table also provides 
summary statistics for the distribution of the Rbar-squared statistics obtained for each of the 
regressions in the parsimonious set obtained through the specification search and for the 
"long-run profitability" measure, YLRi= i/(1-i).  Table 4 shows the standardised t-bar 
statistics obtained on the basis of the average values of adfi in each country, plus the 
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 associated critical values obtained by interpolating between the relevant values for small 
sample sizes provided in Im et al (1997).  To check on the role played by the specification 
search, we also calculated the average value of the adfi obtained for the unrestricted set of 
equations and these are also reported in Table 4 (denoted "t-bar statistic*"). 
 
The results are most interesting. First, we take note of the statistical adequacy of the 
reported regressions and note, from the statistics denoted "A", that the inclusion of the 
lagged Yit term in the model is not required in the majority of the ADF regression but it is 
required in a significant minority. In this minority, tests and regression results obtained 
without including the extra dynamics would be misspecified. Further, we note, from the 
reported R-bar2 statistics and the statistics denoted "B" that the fit of the regressions are 
reasonable in most cases, with the country averages lying in the range [0.249, 0.418] and 
with the vast majority of individual regressions having R-bar2 in excess of 0.1. While the 
regression model of (7) is clearly very simple, these figures indicate that the estimated 
regression models are reasonably well specified and have explanatory power.  
Second, we consider the results of the unit root tests of Table 4 and note that the unit 
root hypothesis is systematically rejected in all countries, whether we use the results 
obtained from the parsimonious set of equations or the unrestricted set. The panel unit root 
test therefore provides compelling evidence that the profitability series are stationary in 
levels, and that the effects of shocks to profitability do die away at least at the infinite 
horizon. It is worth emphasising that unit root tests typically lack power, and it is the panel 
structure of this data set which is exploited by the test of Im et al. And which allows us to 
draw the very strong conclusion that profitability data is levels stationary. 
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Third, we consider the issue of the speed of adjustment to equilibrium and, under the 
(statistically acceptable) assumption that profitability is levels stationary, look to the 
estimated values of  i described in Table 3. Subject to the reservations expressed earlier on 
the non-uniqueness of the measures in the presence of more than one lagged value of Yit in 
(5), the mean values of i provide an indication of the speed of adjustment and these are 
comparable to those obtained in other studies. Interestingly, most of the average values of i 
for the seven countries are in the range [0.22,0.42], with Brazil being close to zero. The 
standard errors associated with the estimate of the mean value of the i are relatively small, 
indicating that these overall measures are relatively precisely estimated. The estimates 
indicate a relatively rapid adjustment to equilibrium and certainly suggest adjustment 
durations less than those observed in the comparable studies of developed markets (see 
below). 
 Fourth and finally, we note the distribution of the long-run profitability figures, 
YLRi. The mean value of the YLRi  estimates lie relatively close to zero and comparison 
with the associated standard error shows that there is no reason to believe this mean figure 
differs from zero in any country. However, the other statistics show that there is 
considerable variablity in the estimated YLRi in some countries. This is because the YLRi is 
estimated as a ratio of estimated parameters (i.e. YLRi = i /(1-i) ) and estimates of i that 
lie close to unity can generate very large (and very imprecisely estimated) values of YLRi. 
Even with this reservation in mind, however, it is worth noting that the statistics denoted "C" 
and "D" show that there are a relatively small number of firms for whom the long run level 
of profitability is significantly greater or less than zero. 
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The discussion on the long-run profitability estimates above notes that some of the estimated 
statistics of interest in Tables 3 and 4 are potentially distorted because estimates of i are 
close to, or even greater than, unity. Their extreme value could have a disproportionate 
effect on the reported average values and result in incorrect inferences being drawn on the 
typical speed of adjustment. In fact, the statistic denoted "D" shows the number of point 
estimates of i which lie outside the interval (-1, 1), meaning that the estimated regressions 
are unstable, and these indicate that instability arises in only a relatively small number of 
cases. However, to check on the sensitivity of the results to this problem, we also  
eestimated the regression models imposing the constraint that the value of i  lies within the 
interval (-1, 1).
17
 The results are much the same as those in Table 2, but some of the extreme 
outlying values have disappeared from the Table.
18
  
 
Finally, Table 5 provides cross-correlation statistics, calculated across the firms in each 
country, for the variables i, YLRi, Yi0 and Yi., where Yi0 is the measure of profitability in 
the first year of the sample and Yi. is the average value of Yit over the sample.  
                                                          
17
 This is achieved by noting that (5) can be re-written in a Moving Average (MA) version Yit =  i + uit, 
where  uit =  1i ui(t-1) + 2i ui(t-2) + it  and where i[1-1i-2i] = i. Written in this form, the model can be 
estimated using exact maximum likelihood methods to impose the constraint that 1<2i<-1. 
18
 Hence, for example, the mean value of the i across firms is 0.025, 0.261, 0.335, 0.310, 0.369, 0.214, 0.421 
in Brazil, India, Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico and Zimbabwe respectively. 
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 V. Persistence of Profitability and Intensity of Competition. 
As indicated earlier, in order to draw conclusions for the nature and degree of competition in 
the sample emerging markets from the results of the time-series analysis above, it is 
necessary to examine for each country the distribution of three parameters - YLR and 2. 
Considering  first, the mean value varies between 0.013 for Brazil and 0.421 for 
Zimbabwe, suggesting that the latter has lower intensity of competition than the former. The 
speed of adjustment to excess short-run profits for the average firm would appear to be 
considerably lower in Zimbabwe than in Brazil. However, it may be useful to bear in mind 
that even a value of of 0.5 implies a fairly rapid convergence: for a firm with profits 
10% above the norm, a  value of 0.5 would suggest that the excess profits will be 
reduced to 1% within three years.  
 
The results reported in Table 3 also show that for most countries the mean YLR is nearly 
zero – in other words, for the average firm, there are no long-run excess profits. This of 
course leaves a considerable number of firms which do make long-term excess profits in 
perpetuity as it were. Overall, the picture which emerges from the analysis of the 
distributions of , YLR and R2 in Table 3 is that competition is more intense in Brazil, 
Mexico and India than in Korea, Jordan and Malaysia. The least competitive country in this 
sample is Zimbabwe, but as indicated above, even in this case evidence suggests that excess 
short-term profits are competed away quite rapidly. 
 
How do the developing countries’ product markets compare in relation to the degree of 
competition with those in advanced countries? Table 6 reports the average values of  
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 obtained by various studies for industrial countries. Table 7 reproduces for purposes of 
comparison the mean values of , YLR and 2 for the sample of emerging markets 
considered in this study. The results with respect to  suggest that the speed of adjustment 
to excess profits for the average firm in developing countries is faster than that in 
advanced countries; in any case, it is no slower. Similar conclusions are reached in 
comparisons of YLR and other indicators of intensity of competition (e.g. the correlation 
between YLR and the initial profitability) for all industrial countries for which 
comparable information is available. One of the studies for industrial countries which is 
closest to ours is that of Geroski and Jacquemin (1988). In this paper they examine the 
relative intensity of competition in the UK, France and West Germany. The  values they 
obtain from their analysis of the persistence of profitability in 55 French, 28 West 
German and 51 UK firms are reported in Table 6 above. Their results for the average 
value of YLR and R-BAR
2
 are as follows: 
 France  Germany UK 
YLR 0.022 0.11 0.219 
R-BAR
2
 0.489 0.377 0.694 
Comparing these results with those summarised in Table 7, suggests that the intensity of 
competition, measured by different indicators of the persistency of profits, is no less in 
emerging markets examined here (including the Asian crisis countries) than in advanced 
industrial countries. 
 
For many this may appear to be a counter-intuitive conclusion. Before commenting on that 
aspect it may be useful to consider the possible biases which could, in principle, have 
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 produced this overall result. The first issue concerns the limited length of our time-series 
samples. This would impart a downward bias to our reported results for  in Table 3 and 
Table 7. However, there is a fairly straight-forward correction to this bias which would at 
most count for 10% of the difference between the values of  reported for the two groups of 
countries
19
. 
 
Secondly, there is a clear survivorship bias in that the emerging market firms being analysed 
in this study are all those which survived. However, a similar bias operates in the case of 
most studies reported in Table 6 for industrial country corporations as well. In view of the 
lack of necessary information, it is difficult to obtain precise estimates of the extent of this 
bias. Nevertheless, there is one piece of evidence which suggests that the survivorship bias 
may be less for emerging markets than for industrial countries. Studies contained in Roberts 
and Tybout (1996) suggest that the incidence of the entry and exit of new firms is generally 
greater in developing than in advanced economies. This would indicate that if there was data 
available for all firms, whether they survived or not, other things being equal, developing 
country corporations would display an even lower degree of persistency compared with 
industrial country corporations. 
 
A third source of bias in this study could arise from the fact that persistency regressions 
reported in this paper are based on accounting rates of return rather than on economic profits 
(see Fisher and McGowen (1983)). Mueller’s (1990) analysis of this issue suggests that this 
bias is unlikely to be important in persistency studies. As Geroski and Jacquemin observe: 
 28 
 “It seems reasonable to think that persistently high accounting rates of return indicate 
persistently high economic rates of return”.  Moreover, it is not clear that this potential bias 
would necessarily be greater in studies of emerging markets than in advanced countries. 
 
Returning to the question of the plausibility of these results, it was noted earlier that many 
serious scholars regard countries like Korea to be intensely competitive. This need not mean 
that the managers are necessarily maximising share-holder wealth: more likely, as suggested 
in a number of studies
20
, they may be maximising market share instead. Moreover, as 
mentioned before, the competition may be contest-based rather than being market-based.  
 
Another important reason for accepting the plausibility of these results is that there is 
evidence that the new entry of firms is relatively greater in developing countries’ product 
markets than those of advanced economies. Large corporations in industrial countries have 
long created barriers to entry through advertising, patents, trade-marks, etc. These inhibit 
potential competition from new firms. In contrast, developing countries are growing fast and 
undergoing enormous technical and structural change. These conditions provide additional 
incentives for new entry and greater competition.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
19
 See further Geroski and Jacquemin (1990) who following Johnston (1972) suggest a correction for the 
bias to consist of multiplying estimated coefficients by T/(T-2), where T is the number of observations in 
the sample. 
20
 See further Amsden (1989), Singh (1998b) and Odagiri (1994) 
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 VI. Stock market Development and Corporate Finance in India – Stylised facts.
21
 
This section briefly reports on the expansion of the stock market and the financing of  
corporate growth in India during the last two decades, in order to examine their implications  
for the analytical issues outlined in sections II.2 and II.3. 
 
The stylised facts for the Indian economy in these spheres may be summarised as follows: 
a) While the Indian stock market was founded more than a century ago, from independence 
in 1947 up until the 1980s it had remained a sleepy backwater in the Indian financial 
system, with little scope for expansion in a regime dominated by state-directed credit. In 
1980, the capitalization ratio was only 5%. As a result of liberalization measures 
initiated in the 1980s, by 1990, the ratio had risen to 13%. After the major change in  
government policy and the acceleration of the pace of liberalization in 1991, stock market 
growth was explosive. By the end of 1993, total market capitalization had reached 40% of 
GDP. 
b) The number of shareholders and investors in mutual funds rose from 2 to 40 million 
over 1980-93. This made the Indian investor population the second largest in the world, 
second only to the U.S. which had about 51 million investors. 
c) However, in terms of the number of companies listed on the stock markets, the Indian 
stock market by the end of 1995 was the largest in the world, with nearly 7,985 listed 
companies. This surpassed the 7,671 listed domestic companies on U.S. exchanges and 
far exceeded those of the U.K. and Germany with 2,078 and 678 listed companies, 
respectively. 
                                                          
21
 This section is based on Singh 1998a, and Singh and Weisse 1998. 
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 d) On the largest Indian stock exchange at Bombay, the daily turnover of shares increased 
almost 30-fold during the 1980s and early 1990s – from 0.13 billion rupees in 1980-81 
to 3.7 billion rupees in 1993-94. The average daily trading volume on the Bombay stock 
market in the early 1990s was about the same as that in London – about 45,000 trades a 
day. At the peak of stock market activity trading occurred at double that rate. As these 
deals put through in a short period of 2 hours, the Bombay stock exchange was reported 
to have the highest density of transactions in the world, behind only that of the Taiwan 
stock exchange (Mayya, 1995).  
e) During the 1980s and the first half of  the 1990s, Indian corporations raised large 
amounts of capital on a very active primary market to finance their growth.  In 1980,  
Rs 929 m. were raised through corporate securities issuance (Balasubramanian, 1993).  
This figure had risen to Rs 2.5 bn by 1985, to a huge Rs 123 bn by 1990, and by 1993-4, 
it reached Rs 225 bn, i.e. a 250-fold increase since 1980.  By contrast the general price 
level rose less than fourfold during this period.  Another indicator of an extremely 
acative primary market was that in 1994-5 nearly 1700 companies raised equity capital 
(either through direct offerings to the public or through rights issues); of these, 369 were 
new companies (RBI, 1995). 
f) In the first large scale empirical studies of corporate finance in developing countries, 
Singh and Hamid (1992) and Singh (1995) examined the financing of corporate growth 
in ten industrialising economies (including India) during the 1980s at a microeconomic 
level.  The results indicated that developing country firms rely heavily on a) external 
finance, and b) within external finance, to an unexpectedly large degree, on equity 
finance.  The results for India indicated that the average Indian corporation, during the 
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 1980s, financed about 40 per cent of its growth of ‘net assets’ (the long-term capital 
employed in the firm) from internal sources (i.e. retained profits) and 60 percent from 
external sources.  Of the latter, nearly a third came from equity issues and two-thirds 
from long-term debt. 
g) Although Indian stock market growth during the 1980s and 90s has been impressive, so 
has it been in several other leading emerging markets.  In Taiwan, market capitalization 
as a proportion of GDP rose from 11 per cent in 1981 to 74 per cent in 1991.  Similarly, 
between 1983 and 1993, the Chilean ratio rose from 13.2 to 78 per cent and the Thai 
from 3.8 to 55.8 per cent.  To put these figures in an historical perspective, Mullins 
(1993) notes that it probably took the US stock market 85 years (1810-95) to achieve a 
broadly similar increase in capitalization ratio, from 7 to 71 per cent. 
h) A severe liquidity crisis in 1990 obliged the Indian government to change course and it 
greatly accelerated the process of liberalisation which had started in the 1980s.  
However, the Indian economic reforms of  the 1990s have not only been associated with 
the vast expansion of stock market activity, but also with important steps to improve the 
functioning of the markets, to make them more transparent, and less subject to insider 
dealing and fraud.  Although the newly-appointed regulatory authority, the Securities 
and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), has apparently made some progress in a number 
of these areas, it will be a long time before the Indian stock market loses its justly 
deserved reputation of being a “snake pit” to use Joshi and Little’s expressive phrase.  
Indeed, notwithstanding SEBI’s valiant efforts the Indian press continues to regale 
stories of fresh stock market scams.  One leading Indian magazine wrote not so long ago 
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 that market regulation is almost non-existent and that the financial markets have 
become as a consequence a “virtual freeway”.22 
 
The above observations about the expansion of the stock market and the large use of 
external finances, including equity finance, by Indian and other developing country firms 
certainly contradict a priori expectations about corporate finance in emerging markets 
outlined in Section II.2.  The reasons for these anomalous results are explored elsewhere
23
 
and will not be commented upon except to suggest that the important question raised by 
Schleifer and Vishny (1997) in their excellent survey on corporate governance still remains 
important.  The two authors rightly asked :  “how can firms raise equity finance in countries 
with virtually no protection of minority investors, even if these countries are rapidly 
growing?”  They went on to enquire:  “Who are the buyers of these equities?  If they are 
dispersed shareholders, why are they buying the equity despite the absence of minority 
protection?”  These questions, as the Indian case above illustrates, still require a satisfactory 
answer. 
 
Equally importantly, these facts also raise some interesting issues for the current research on 
law, finance and corporate governance referred to earlier.  What the Indian case suggests is 
that there can be very quick but far-reaching changes in corporate finance such as those 
which occurred in the country during the 1980s and in the early 1990s.  There was, however, 
no fundamental change in the basic legal framework or in the principles of company law, or 
for that matter in the degree of enforcement.  The government changed economic policy and 
                                                          
22
 India Today (June 16, 1997). 
23
 Singh (1995); Singh and Weiss (1998) 
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 direction in the 1980s and the long dormant stock market came alive.  It turned into an 
important source for financing corporate growth as well as providing a vehicle for the 
savings of households.  A similar mixture of changes in government policy and external 
economic environment occurred in a number of other emerging markets as well during the 
1980s, leading to a very fast expansion of stock market activity:  this happened both in civil 
law and in common law countries such as India.  In other words, what is being suggested is 
that for the kind of huge changes which occurred in a number of countries in corporate 
finance and stock market activity in the 1980s, differences over time within the same 
country are more important than differences between countries and their basic legal systems. 
 
VII. Conclusion. 
The main purpose of this paper has been to report on investigations into the dynamics of the 
competitive process and the intensity of competition in emerging markets by time-series 
analysis of corporate rates of return.  This is very much work in progress.  We shall go on to 
look at further aspects of competition and corporate governance.  One area for immediate 
investigation is the determinants of inter-country and inter-firm differences in the 
persistency coefficients.  This will, inter alia, involve examining the relationship between 
profits persistence and directly observable corporate governance variables.  Similarly, our 
work on the financing of corporate growth is examining the changes which occurred in the 
1990s in this sphere.  The results of this research will be reported in future papers. 
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Table 1. Concentration Ratios in Emerging Economies 
    
 
          
Economy  Three-firm concentration ratios  
 
   Share 
Japan, 1980   56 
Korea, Rep. of, 1981   62 
Taiwan, China, 1981   49 
 
Four-firm concentration ratios 
Argentina, 1984   43 
Brazil, 1980   51 
Chile, 1979   50 
India, 1984   46 
Indonesia, 1985   56 
Mexico, 1980   48 
Pakistan, 1985   68 
Turkey, 1976   67 
United States, 1972   40 
Source: World Bank 1993 
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 Table 2 
Rates of return (after tax) on total assets in seven emerging markets 
(For the data set used in Persistency Regressions) 
   No. Firms Mean  St. Dev   Min.  Max. 
 
Brazil 1985-1995  56  0.041  0.053  -0.087  0.158 
India 1982-1992 40  0.121  0.041   0.073  0.295 
Jordan 1980-1994 17  0.090  0.046   0.018  0.213 
Korea 1980-1994 82  0.095  0.022   0.048  0.174 
Malaysia 1983-94 62  0.089  0.044   0.015  0.215 
Mexico 1984-1994 39  0.090  0.047  -0.018  0.201 
Zimbabwe 1980-1994 40  0.143  0.046   0.057  0.266 
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 Table 3 
Summary of results on the estimated Augmented Dickey-Fuller regressions  
(following a specification search using SBC) 
 
 i i adfi  Rbar2i YLRi 
 
Brazil  
 
Mean  -0.001 (0.005)  0.013 (0.050) -2.743   0.418   0.003 (0.050) 
Median  0.005  -0.064  -2.794  0.433   0.005 
St. dev.   0.071   0.345   1.009  0.187   0.060 
Min.  -0.189  -0.648  -5.577  0.045  -0.136 
Max.   0.118   0.753  -0.826  0.790   0.120 
(A = 47/56 firms, B = 54/56 firms, C = 1/56 firms, D = 3/56 firms, E = 0/56 firms) 
 
 
India  
 
Mean   0.003 (0.003)  0.221 (0.059) -2.180    0.326   0.000 (0.192) 
Median -0.004   0.226  -2.200   0.324  -0.009 
St. dev.   0.052   0.433   1.187   0.255   0.062 
Min.  -0.078  -0.561  -4.683  -0.113  -0.151 
Max.   0.269   1.097   0.437   0.906   0.234 
(A = 28/40 firms, B = 29/40 firms, C = 2/40 firms, D = 4/40 firms, E = 1/40 firms) 
 
 
Jordan  
  
Mean    0.008 (0.005)  0.348 (0.063)  -2.447    0.299    0.051 (0.099) 
Median -0.004     0.333   -2.500    0.300   -0.008 
St. dev.   0.040    0.318   1.003   0.167   0.214 
Min.  -0.028   -0.289   -4.399   -0.091   -0.059  
Max.   0.121    0.989   -0.060    0.605    0.860  
(A = 13/17 firms, B = 15/17 firms, C = 1/17 firms, D = 0/17 firms, E = 0/17 firms) 
 
 
Korea  
 
Mean   0.001 (0.001)   0.323 (0.030)  -2.568    0.300    0.005 (0.462) 
Median  0.001    0.359   -2.426    0.289    0.002  
St. dev.  0.018   0.381   1.694   0.226   0.037 
Min.  -0.026   -0.557   -10.728 -0.090   -0.048  
Max.   0.056    1.146    0.874    0.905    0.205  
(A = 63/82 firms, B = 64/82 firms, C = 7/82 firms, D = 2/82 firms, E = 3/82 firms) 
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 Malaysia  
 
Mean  -0.001 (0.002)  0.349 (0.037) -2.326    0.302    0.009 (0.080)  
Median -0.001    0.340   -2.288    0.297   -0.001  
St. dev.  0.042   0.319   1.090   0.219   0.067 
Min.  -0.100   -0.402   -6.217   -0.096   -0.106  
Max.   0.148    0.943   -0.456    0.807    0.336 
(A = 42/62 firms, B = 46/62 firms, C = 4/62 firms, D = 7/62 firms, E = 0/62 firms) 
 
 
Mexico  
 
Mean  -0.005 (0.004)   0.222 (0.056)  -2.269    0.316   -0.002 (0.238) 
Median -0.005    0.254   -2.126    0.252   -0.007  
St. dev.  0.041   0.281    0.797   0.182   0.048 
Min.  -0.105   -0.430   -3.938   -0.029   -0.115  
Max.   0.062    0.750   -0.880    0.645    0.132  
(A = 34/39 firms, B = 36/39 firms, C = 0/39 firms, D = 0/39 firms, E = 0/39 firms) 
 
 
Zimbabwe  
 
Mean  -0.005 (0.003)  0.421 (0.042) -2.225    0.249    0.157 (4.048) 
Median -0.003    0.507   -2.006    0.201   -0.000 
St. dev.  0.043   0.338   1.097   0.182   0.977  
Min.  -0.169   -0.839   -5.473   -0.076   -0.092  
Max.   0.076    1.006    0.037    0.723    6.171  
(A = 31/40 firms, B = 32/40 firms, C = 0/40 firms, D = 4/40 firms, E = 1/40 firms) 
 
 
Notes: 
Coefficients i, i  refer to the parameters of the Dickey-Fuller regression of (7) in the text, where i = i -1. 
The adfi are the t-values associated with i in the same regressions, and the Rbar-2i also relate to these 
regressions. YLRi = i/(1-i ). The reported statistics refer to the distribution of  the statistics across the firms 
within the country. (Standard errors are in parentheses). 
 
The reported regressions are the outcome of a specification search in which i is set equal to zero according to 
the SBC. 
 
"A" shows the number of firms for which i = 0 in each country. "B" shows the number of firms for which 
Rbar-squared exceeds 0.1. "C" shows the number of firms for which YLRi is significantly positive (working at 
the 5% level of significance) and "D" shows the number of firms for which YLRi is significantly negative. "E" 
shows the proportion of regressions which are  dynamically unstable.  
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 Table 4 
Standardised t-bar test statistics for the Im et al unit roots tests based on adfi and adfi*
(a)
 
 
 
  t-bar stat [t-bar stat*]
(a)
 (95%, 90% critical values)
(b) 
 
Brazil  -7.885  -5.198   (-1.70, -1.75) 
India  -3.659  -2.175   (-1.75, -1.79) 
Jordan  -3.855  -3.101   (-1.90, -1.82) 
Korea  -9.558  -6.327   (-1.70, -1.66) 
Malaysia -6.130  -4.783   (-1.76, -1.71) 
Mexico  -4.042  -1.971   (-1.75, -1.79) 
Zimbabwe -4.519  -3.661   (-1.78, -1.71) 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) Average values of the adfi for the unrestricted set of equations (reported here to assess  
the role of the specification search). 
 
(b)  Obtained by interpolation between the relevant values for small samples provided in Im et al. 
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 Table 5 
Cross-correlation statistics 
 
 
 i YLRi Yi0 Yi. 
 
 
 Brazil  1.000    0.160    0.144    0.060  
      1.000    0.099    0.939  
       1.000    0.354  
          1.000  
 
 India  1.000    0.105    0.002    0.164  
      1.000    0.018    0.531  
        1.000   0.327  
          1.000  
 
 Jordan  1.000    0.391    0.376    0.581  
     1.000    0.072    0.259  
       1.000    0.619  
         1.000  
 
 Korea  1.000    0.173    0.043    0.138  
     1.000    0.254    0.570  
        1.000    0.475  
         1.000  
 
 Malaysia  1.000    0.289    0.154    0.061  
      1.000    0.207    0.638  
        1.000    0.697  
          1.000  
 
 Mexico 1.000    0.253    0.008    0.298  
      1.000    0.300    0.911  
       1.000    0.559  
         1.000  
 
 Zimbabwe 1.000    0.298    0.099    0.328  
      1.000    0.321    0.258  
        1.000    0.537  
          1.000  
 
 40 
 Table 6. Summary of previous persistence of profit studies 
 
Author               Country       Sample     Observations    Number     Sample mean 
                    Period       per firm            of firms      (Lamda [i]  
Geroski and  
Jacquemin (1988)         UK     1947-77         29   51    0.488    
    France  1965-82         18  55    0.412  
    West   1961-81 21  28    0.410  
Germany 
Schwalbach et.al  
(1989)    West   1961-82 22  299    0.485 
Germany  
Mueller (1990)              US  1950-72         23  551    0.183 
Cubbin and   UK  1948-77         30  243    0.482  
Geroski (1990) 
Khemani and  Canada 1964-82         19  129    0.425  
Shapiro (1990) 
Odagiri and  Japan  1964-82         19  376    0.465 
Yamawaki (1990) 
 
Schohl (1990)  West   1961-81 21  283    0.509 
Germany 
Kambhampati  India  1970-85         16  42    0.484 
(1995)b 
 
a - Based on nominal profit on capital, before tax 
b – Estimations are for industry groups. Estimates of lamda are from a range of specifications for the 
persistence model, which differ across industries.   
Source – Goddard and Wilson (1999) 
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 Table 7 
Mean values of , YLR and  2. 
Mean  Mean YLR Mean 2 
Brazil 0.013 0.003 0.418 
India 0.229 0.003 0.282 
Jordan 0.348 0.05 0.299 
Korea 0.323 0.005 0.3 
Malaysia 0.349 0.009 0.302 
Mexico 0.222 -0.002 0.316 
Zimbabwe 0.421 0.157 0.249 
 
Source: Table 2 above. 
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